Abstract-Channel allocation was extensively studied in the framework of cellular networks. But the emergence of new system concepts, such as cognitive radio systems, has brought this topic into the focus of research again. In this paper, we study in detail the problem of competitive multi-radio multi-channel allocation in wireless networks. We study the existence of Nash equilibria in a static game and we conclude that, in spite of the non-cooperative behavior of such devices, their channel allocation results in a load-balancing solution. In addition, we consider the fairness properties of the resulting channel allocations and their resistance to the possible coalitions of a subset of players. Finally, we present three algorithms that achieve a load-balancing Nash equilibrium channel allocation; each of them using a different set of available information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) is one of the widely used techniques that enables several us er s t o share a communication medium that consists of a given frequency band [22] , [23] . The basic principle of FDMA is to split up the available bandwidth to distinct sub-bands called channels. Assigning the radio transceivers to these channels is commonly referred to as the channel allocation problem. 1 Not surprisingly, an efficient channel allocation is a cornerstone of the design of wireless networks.
In this paper, we present a game-theoretic analysis of fixed channel allocation strategies of devices that use multiple radios. Using a static non-cooperative game, we analyze the scenario of a single collision domain, i.e., where each of the devices can interfere with a transmission of every other device. We derive the Nash equilibria in this game and show that they result in load balancing over the channels. Our main result, Theorem 1, shows that there exist two types of Nash equilibria: in the first type, each user distributes his radios over the available channels, whereas in the second type, some users allocate multiple radios on certain channels. We also study fairness issues and the problem of coalition formation in the channel allocation problem. We show that a Nash equilibrium
The work presented in this paper was supported (in part) by the National Competence Center in Research on Mobile Information and Communication Systems (NCCR-MICS), a center supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation under grant number 5005-67322. 1 In the literature, the terms channel assignment and frequency assignment are also used for the channel allocation problem.
that resists coalitions of users is necessarily fair as well. Furthermore, we propose three algorithms to achieve the Nash equilibria. The first is a sequential algorithm that needs global coordination, the second is a distributed algorithm that needs perfect information and the third is a distributed algorithm that is based on imperfect information. We provide the proof for the convergence properties of these algorithms.
This work is a first step towards a deeper understanding of the non-cooperative behavior of such devices and is applicable in particular in the emerging field of cognitive radio systems [15] .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present related work on channel allocation and channel access in wireless networks. In Section III, we introduce our system model along with a game-theoretic description of competitive channel allocation. In Section IV, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the Nash equilibria in the channel allocation game. We study fairness issues in Section V. In addition, we provide some results on coalition-proof Nash equilibria in Section VI. In Section VII, we propose three algorithms to reach the desired Nash equilibria and study their convergence properties. Finally, we conclude in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
There has been a significant amount of work on channel allocation in wireless networks, notably for cellular networks. Channel allocation schemes in cellular networks can be divided into three categories: fixed channel allocation (FCA), dynamic channel allocation (DCA) and hybrid channel allocation (HCA), which combines the two former methods.
In a fixed channel allocation scheme, the same number of channels are permanently allocated to the radios at the base stations. To study fixed channel allocation, most authors used graph coloring / labelling techniques (e.g., in [24] ). The FCA method performs very well under a high traffic load, but it cannot adapt to changing traffic conditions or user distributions.
To overcome the inflexibility of FCA, many authors propose dynamic channel allocation (DCA) methods (e.g. as presented in [9] , [25] ). In contrast to FCA, there is no constant relationship between the base stations in a cell and their
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This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE INFOCOM 2007 proceedings. respective channels. All channels are available for each base station and they are assigned dynamically as new users arrive. Typically, the available channels are evaluated according to a cost function and the one with the minimum cost is used [10] . Due to its dynamic property, the DCA can adapt to changing traffic demand. Because adaptation implies some cost, it performs worse than FCA in the case of a heavy traffic load. For a comprehensive survey on the topic, we refer the reader to [16] .
Due to the emergence of alternative communication technologies, channel allocation schemes are becoming a focus of research again. Mishra et al. [19] propose a channel allocation method for wireless local area networks (WLANs) based weighted graph coloring. Zheng and Cao [26] present a rulebased spectrum management scheme for cognitive radios.
Recently, several researchers have considered devices using multiple radios, notably in mesh networks (for a survey on mesh networks, see [2] ). In the multi-radio communication context, channel allocation and access also became one of the crucial topics. Related work on multi-radio medium access includes, but is not restricted to [1] , [3] , [21] .
In all the related work cited so far, the authors assumed that the radio devices cooperate to achieve a high system performance. But this assumption might not hold, as the users of these devices are usually selfish and they want to maximize their own performance without necessarily respecting the system objectives. Game theory provides a straightforward tool to study medium access problems in competitive wireless networks and has been applied to the CSMA/CA protocol [7] , [17] and to the Aloha protocol [18] . Furthermore, a fixed channel allocation game was presented in [14] based on graph coloring. Unfortunately, their model does not apply to multiradio devices. For cognitive radio networks, the authors of [20] propose a dynamic channel allocation scheme based on a potential game. In addition, they suggest another technique based on machine learning with different utility functions. Cao and Zheng [8] propose distributed spectrum allocation in cognitive radio networks based on local bargaining.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND CONCEPTS
We assume that the available frequency band is divided into orthogonal channels of the same bandwidth using the FDMA method (e.g., 8 orthogonal channels in case of the IEEE 802.11a protocol). We denote the set of available orthogonal channels by C.
In our model, pairs of users want to communicate with each other over a single hop. We assume that each user participates in only one such communication session, hence we denote the set of such communication links by N . Each user owns a device equipped with k ≤ |C| radio transmitters, all having the same communication capabilities. The communication between two devices is bidirectional and they always have some packets to exchange. Due to the bidirectional links, the sender and the receiver are able to coordinate and thus to select the same channels to communicate. Accordingly, we refer to each communicating pair as a selfish player, whose objective is to maximize its total rate or channel utilization. We will use this term to denote both the communicating pair of users and the communication link between them. We assume that there is a finite number of players. We further assume that each device can hear the transmissions of every other device if they are using the same channel. This means that the players reside in a single collision domain. We make this assumption to avoid the hidden terminal problem described for example in [23] . Because the devices reside in a single collision domain, it is reasonable to assume that the channels have roughly the same expected channel characteristics.
We assume that there is a mechanism that enables the players to use multiple channels to communicate at the same time (as it is implemented in [1] for example). We denote the number of radios of player i using channel c by k i,c for every c ∈ C. For the simplicity of presentation, let us denote the set of channels used by player i by C i , where C i ⊂ C and 0 ≤ |C i | ≤ k. We further assume that there is no limitation on the number of radios per channel.
We formulate the multi-radio channel allocation problem as a non-cooperative game as follows. We define the strategy of player i as its channel allocation vector:
Hence, his strategy consists in defining the number of radios on each of the channels. 2 The strategy vectors of all players defines the strategy matrix S (i.e., the strategy profile), where the row i of the matrix corresponds to the strategy vector of player i:
Furthermore, we denote the strategy matrix except for the strategy of player i by S −i . Figure 1 presents an example channel allocation with six available channels (|C| = 6), four players (|N | = 4) and each user device equipped by four radios (k = 4). The total number of radios employed by player i can be written as k i = P c k i,c . Similarly, we can obtain the number of radios using a particular channel k c = P i k i,c . In Figure 1 , each player has a radio on channel c 1 , but channel c 5 is occupied only by player p 2 . Player p 3 employs two radios on channel c 2 to get more bandwidth on that particular channel. Regarding the number of radios per player, we have k p1 = k p2 = k p3 = 4 and k p4 = 2, meaning that player p 4 is not using all of his radios.
We assume that the players are rational and their objective is to maximize their payoff in the network. We denote the payoff of player i by U i . For simplicity, we assume that each player i wants to maximize his total rate (R i ) in the system and thus the payoff function is the achieved bitrate.
We assume that the total rate on channel c is shared equally among the radio transmitters using that channel. This fair rate allocation is achieved for example by using a reservationbased TDMA schedule on a given channel. A similar result was reported by Bianchi in [6] for the CSMA/CA protocol. Even if the radio transmitters are controlled by selfish users in the CSMA/CA protocol, they can achieve this fair sharing as shown in [7] . We further assume that the total available bitrate R c (k c ) on a channel c (i.e., the sum of the achieved bitrate of all players on channel c) is a non-increasing function of the number of radios k c deployed on this channel. In fact R c (k c ) is independent of k c for a TDMA protocol and for the CSMA/CA protocol using optimal backoff window values [6] . In practice, the backoff window values used in the CSMA/CA protocol implementation (e.g., in the 802.11 standard) are not optimal; and due to packet collisions R c (k c ) becomes a decreasing function of k c for k c > 1. As we assume that channels have the same bandwidth and channel characteristics, the rate function does not depend on the channel and thus we have the total rate R(k c ) for any channel c ∈ C. If k c = 0, we define R(0) = 0; note however that this case has no relevance in our model. We emphasize that our system model is general enough to incorporate many multiple access techniques, such as TDMA or CSMA/CA. Figure 2 presents the total rate R(k c ) as a function of the number of radios using channel c. If player i chooses to operate k i,c radios in a given channel, his rate on this channel can be written as
We assume that the players do not cheat at the MAC layer as opposed to the model for example in [7] . Thus, we can write that R i,c > 0 for all c ∈ C, where k i,c > 0. Recall that in Figure 1 , the higher the number of radios in a given channel is, the lower the rate per radio is. Hence, for example for player p 2 , we have R 2,1 < R 2,4 < R 2,3 < R 2,5 . We can obtain the total rate R i for player i by R i = P c R i,c . In summary, we can write the payoff function for player i as:
We model the channel allocation problem with a single stage game, which corresponds to a fixed channel allocation among the players.
In order to study the strategic interaction of the players, we first introduce the concept of Nash equilibrium [12] , [13] .
Definition 1: (Nash Equilibrium -NE): The strategy matrix S * = {s * 1 , . . . , s * |N | } defines a Nash Equilibrium (NE), if for every player i, we have:
for every strategy s 0 i . In other words, in a NE none of the players can unilaterally change its strategy to increase its payoff. A NE solution is often inefficient from the system point of view. We characterize the efficiency of the solution by the concept of Paretooptimality.
Definition 2: (Pareto-Optimality): The strategy matrix S po is Pareto-optimal if @S 0 such that:
with strict inequality for at least one player i. This means that in a Pareto-optimal channel allocation S po one cannot improve the payoff of any player i without decreasing the payoff of at least one other player j.
IV. NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we study the existence of Nash equilibria in the single collision domain channel allocation game. Note that we omit the proofs of the results due to space limitations, but we provide an extended version of this work in [11] .
It is straightforward to see that if the total number of radios is smaller than or equal to the number of channels, then a flat channel allocation, in which the number of radios per channel does not exceed one, is a Nash equilibrium.
For the remainder of the paper, we assume that |N |·k > |C|, hence the devices have a conflict during the channel allocation process.
In the following, we consider a NE strategy matrix in the multi-radio channel allocation game denoted by S * , where s * i ∈ S * is the NE strategy of player i (i.e., the i-th row of the matrix).
We first show the following intuitive result: a selfish player should use all of his radios in order to maximize his total rate.
Lemma 1: If S * is a NE of the multi-radio channel allocation game, then k i = k, ∀i.
In the example presented in Figure 1 , Lemma 1 does not hold for players p 4 , because it uses only two radios. Hence, the example cannot be a NE.
Let us now consider two arbitrary channels b and c. Without loss of generality, we assume that there are more radios using This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE INFOCOM 2007 proceedings. channel b, meaning that k b ≥ k c , and denote their difference by:
We define another difference value γ i,b,c as:
Let us now divide the channels in a channel allocation S into three sets. We define the set of channels C max with the maximum number of radios, i.e., where b ∈ C max has k b = max l∈C k l . Similarly, let us define the set of the least occupied channels C min , where c ∈ C min has k c = min l∈C k l . In Figure 1 , C max = {c 1 } and C min = {c 5 , c 6 }.
In the following proposition, we show that in a Nash equilibrium, the difference in the total number of radios between any two channels cannot exceed one.
Proposition 1: If S * is a NE in the multi-radio channel allocation game, then δ b,c ≤ 1 for all b, c ∈ C.
Using Proposition 1, we express a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the NE.
Theorem 1: Assume that |N | · k > |C|. Then a channel allocation S * is a NE iff the two following conditions hold:
An example of a NE channel allocation corresponding to the first case is shown in Figure 3 . Figure 4 presents an example for the second case. Theorem 1 establishes an interesting property about NE: In fact, all NE channel allocations achieve load-balancing over the channels in C. Furthermore, we observe two types of Nash equilibria as expressed in the second condition of the theorem. In the first type, each player distributes his radios such that he has at most one radio per channel. Intuitively, this results in load balancing. Note, however, the existence of a second type of Nash equilibria, in which some players allocate multiple radios on certain channels.
In the next theorem, we will show that allowing selfish channel allocation results in an efficient spectrum utilization if the rate function is independent of the number of radios on a certain channel. This theorem is a generalization of Fact 1.
Theorem 2: Assume that the rate function R(·) is independent of k c on any channel c. Then any NE channel allocation S * is Pareto-optimal. Note that this result does not hold for decreasing rate functions, because the players might remove some of their radios to decrease the total number of radios on certain channels. If they do this mutually, they could mutually increase each others payoff. This issue leads us to cooperative games and is part of our future work.
V. FAIRNESS ISSUES
In this section, we study the fairness properties of the selfish multi-radio channel allocation game. Fairness is an important aspect of resource allocation problems in general, and of computer networks in particular. We have seen in Section IV that in the selfish multi-radio channel allocation problem, the NE achieve load balancing. Unfortunately, these NE might be highly unfair by giving advantage to some players and neglecting others. For example, in the channel allocation presented in Figure 4 assuming that the rate function R(·) is constant, player p 1 has the total rate U 1 = 19 20 , whereas player p 4 has the total rate U 4 = 16 20 . In order to study the fairness properties of the NE channel allocations, we use a particular metric called max-min fairness (MMF) as defined in [5] :
Definition 3: (Max-Min Fairness -MMF): The strategy matrix S mmf is max-min fair if the payoff of player i cannot be increased without decreasing the payoff of another player j for which U i (S mmf ) ≥ U j (S mmf ). Using this concept, we identify the max-min fair NE channel allocations as expressed in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3: A NE channel allocation S * is max-min fair if and only if P c∈C min
In other words, if the total number of radios in the least allocated channels are equal for every player, the NE allocation is max-min fair. For example, the channel allocation in Figure 3 is max-min fair.
From this theorem, we can immediately see that the perfectly balanced channel allocation is also max-min fair.
Corollary 1: If S * is a NE such that C min = C max (i.e., k b = k c , ∀b, c ∈ C), then S * is max-min fair as well.
VI. COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA
The definition of NE expresses the resistance to the deviation of a single player. In a realistic situation, it might be possible that several players collude to increase their payoff at the expense of other players. Such a collusion is called a coalition. The problem of how these coalitions are formed is a research topic in itself, thus in this paper we assume that any group of players can form a coalition. We can generalize the notion of NE for coalitions as defined in [4] .
Definition 4: (Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium -CPNE): The strategy matrix S cpne defines a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium if there does not exist any coalition Γ ⊂ N and any strategy of this coalition S 0 Γ such that the following set of conditions is true:
with strict inequality for at least one player i ∈ Γ. This means that no coalition can deviate from S cpne such that the payoff of at least one of its members increases and the payoff of other members do not change. 3 From the definition, we can immediately see the following fact:
Fact 2: If S * is a NE such that C min = C max (i.e., k b = k c , ∀b, c ∈ C), then S * is coalition-proof as well. The intuition is that in a channel allocation S * for which k b = k c , ∀b, c ∈ C, any player that changes necessarily decreases his payoff, hence S * is a coalition-proof NE by definition.
In the remainder of this section, we assume that C min 6 = C max and we derive results that highlight the coalition-proof NE. First, we prove a necessary condition that enables a given NE allocation to be coalition-proof in addition.
Theorem 4: If NE channel allocation S cpne is coalitionproof then there does not exist two channels b ∈ C max and c ∈ C min and two players i, j ∈ N such that k i,b > 0 and k j,b > 0 whereas k i,c = 0 and k j,c = 0.
To illustrate the condition of Theorem 4, let us emphasize that the example shown in Figure 3 is not a coalition-proof NE. Assume that Γ = {p 3 , p 4 }. Then, player p 4 can increase the payoff of player p 3 without decreasing his own payoff by moving his radio from channel c 6 to c 1 . We provide an example for a coalition-proof NE in Figure 5 . We could not prove that the set of conditions in Theorem 4 is sufficient to establish a coalition-proof NE, neither could we find a counterexample, where the conditions hold and the channel allocation is not coalition-proof NE. Hence, we formulate the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1: If there does not exist two channels b ∈ C max and c ∈ C min and two players i, j ∈ N such that k i,b > 0 and k j,b > 0 whereas k i,c = 0 and k j,c = 0 then the NE channel allocation S cpne is coalition-proof. Hence the above condition is a necessary and sufficient condition. 3 Note that our definition corresponds to the principle of weak deviation. One can define the notion of a strict deviation of a coalition which requires that each coalition member increases its payoff by deviating. In the literature of coalition-proof equilibria, both concepts are used.
Nonetheless, we can show that the set of coalition-proof NE channel allocations is a subset of the max-min fair channel allocations.
Theorem 5: If NE channel allocation S is coalition-proof (strictly speaking if the necessary condition expressed in Theorem 4 holds) then it is max-min fair as well.
VII. CONVERGENCE TO A NASH EQUILIBRIUM
We have demonstrated in Section IV that the noncooperative behavior of the selfish players leads to loadbalancing Nash equilibria. In this section, we propose three algorithms, each using a different set of available information, to enable the selfish players to converge to one of these Nash equilibria from an arbitrary initial configuration. The three algorithms are the following: 1) a centralized algorithm using perfect information, 2) a distributed algorithm using perfect information, and 3) a distributed algorithm using imperfect (local) information.
A. Centralized Algorithm Using Perfect Information
We have proved in Theorem 1 that a Nash equilibrium channel allocation has a load-balancing property. In addition, we have shown in Theorem 2 that for a constant rate function the Nash equilibria are Pareto-optimal as well. First we present the pseudo-code of Algorithm 1, a simple centralized algorithm to achieve one of these efficient Nash equilibria. for j = 1 to k do 3:
if kc = k l , ∀c, l ∈ C then 4:
use radio j on a channel c, where k i,c = 0 5:
use radio j on a channel c, where kc = min l∈C k l 7:
end if 8: end for
9: end for
Using the algorithm, the players allocate their radios such that they fill the channels almost equally. Note that the algorithm requires the sequential action of the players and hence it needs global coordination. In addition, the players must have perfect information about the number of radios on each of the channels. This can be achieved by the global coordination mentioned before or by having an extra radio per device for scanning the channels. Global coordination is unlikely to exist in a wireless networking scenario with selfish players. The second assumption about perfect information might not hold either, because selfish players should allocate all of their radios for communication as shown in Lemma 1. It is possible to model the cost of scanning with one radio instead of using it for communication. The investigation of this issue is part of our future work.
B. Distributed Algorithm Using Perfect Information
In order to overcome the limitations of the centralized algorithm proposed in Section VII-A, we suggest a second algorithm that does not require global coordination, but still assumes perfect information about the available channels.
We define a round-based distributed algorithm that works as follows. First, we assume that there exists a random radio assignment of the players over the channels. For simplicity, we exclude the Nash equilibria that correspond to the second case of Theorem 1. This means that we assume that no player allocates more than one device on any channel. After the initial channel assignment, each player evaluates the number of radios (which defines the approximate length of the round) on each of the channels c ∈ C and tries to improve his total rate by reorganizing his radios. Unfortunately, this procedure might result in a continuous reallocation of the radios for all players. An example for such a continuous reorganization is shown in Figure 6 , where channel c 6 is empty and thus each player moves his radio from c 1 to c 6 . In the next round, the same effect happens and they all move their radios back from c 6 to c 1 . To avoid these unstable channel allocations, we leverage the technique of backoff mechanism well known in the IEEE 802.11 medium access technology [23] . We define a backoff window W and each player chooses a random initial value for his backoff counter with uniform probability from the set {1, . . . , W }. Then in every round each player decreases his backoff counter by one and applies the re-allocation of his radios only when the backoff counter reaches zero. After he changes his channel allocation, he resets the backoff counter as described previously. We can notice that using the backoff mechanism, the players play a game in an almost sequential order.
We provide the pseudo-code for Algorithm 2 as follows. We can prove that Algorithm 2 stabilizes in one of the loadbalancing Nash equilibrium channel allocations.
Theorem 6: Algorithm 2 converges to one of the NE channel allocations.
C. Distributed Algorithm Using Imperfect Information
The distributed algorithm presented in Section VII-B still uses perfect information. Hence, the limitations due to this property are the same as for Algorithm 1.
In this subsection, we assume that players have imperfect information, meaning that they know the total number of radios on only those channels on which they operate a radio. In order to improve their performance, they proceed as follows. Each player applies the random backoff mechanism we introduced Algorithm 2 Distributed NE channel allocation algorithm using perfect information 1: random channel allocation 2: while not in a NE do 3:
get the current channel allocation 4:
if backoff counter is 0 then 6: reorganize the radios of i in order to maximize the total rate: 7:
for j = 1 to k do 8:
assume that radio j uses channel b 9:
move the radio j from b to channel c min if ∃c min ∈ C, c min = arg minc kc such that k i,c min = 0 and kc min < k b − 1 10: end for 11:
reset the backoff counter to a new value from the set {1, . . . , W } 12:
decrease the backoff counter value by one 14:
end if 15: end for
16: end while
in Section VII-B. In each round where player i's backoff counter is equal to zero, he calculates the average number of devices on the channels he knows (recall that we denote this set by C i ). We denote the average number of devices on the channels in C i by m i . For each channel b ∈ C i with k b − m i ≥ 1 player i moves his radio to another channel c / ∈ C i . The probability to chose a channel c / ∈ C i is 1 |C| . This is the first property of the algorithm with imperfect information.
Similarly to Theorem 6, we can show that the above procedure reaches a stable state. Unfortunately, the available local information might be insufficient for the players to determine if the achieved stable state is Nash equilibrium. We show an example for such a "false Nash equilibrium" in Figure 7 . Fig. 7 . An example for a stability state using the distributed algorithm with imperfect information. Here |C| = 6, |N | = 5 and k = 3. Each player believes that this is a Nash equilibrium due to the insufficient local information.
In order to solve the problem of inefficient stable states, we introduce the following mechanism: player i checks the number of radios for each of the channels b ∈ C i as suggested above and with a small probability he moves his radio to another channel c / ∈ C i even if 0 < k b − m i < 1. He chooses the new channel c with a probability 1 |C\Ci| as presented before. This second property allows us to resolve the inefficient stability states, but at the same time, it will also cause the instability of the Nash equilibria.
We provide the description of our algorithm below. Note that this algorithm now includes both properties: 1) the backoff mechanism and 2) the mechanism to resolve inefficient stable states.
Due to the second property of our algorithm, its does not perfectly converge to the existing Nash equilibria (more This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE INFOCOM 2007 proceedings.
Algorithm 3 Distributed NE channel allocation algorithm using local information 1: random channel allocation 2: while () do 3:
if k b > m i then 10:
move the radio j from b to c / ∈ C i , where c is chosen with uniform random probability from the set C\C i 11:
end if 12: end for 13: else 14:
for j = 1 to k do 15: assume that radio j uses channel b 16:
move the radio j from b to c / ∈ C i with probability , where c is chosen with uniform random probability from the set C\C precisely, it converges there with high probability, but it does not stay in a Nash equilibrium solution). Nevertheless, we can observe that the algorithm remains in states that are "close" to Nash equilibria in terms of load-balancing. We demonstrate this intuition by the simulations presented in Section VII-D.
D. Simulation Results for Algorithm 3
We implemented Algorithm 3 in MATLAB and with a special focus on wireless IEEE 802.11a protocol (meaning that we have chosen 8 orthogonal channels as a default value for |C|). In this subsection, we present our simulation results showing the convergence time and efficiency of Algorithm 3. In each of the simulations, we assume a constant rate function R(·). Note however, that the algorithm shows similar properties for any decreasing rate function introduced in Section III.
Let us first highlight the best and worst case in terms of the desired load-balancing for Algorithm 3. The best case is one of the NE channel allocations, and the worst case is characterized by the fact that there exist k channels where each of the players have a radio, whereas the rest of the channels have no radios at all. In Figure 8 , we present an example of the worst case channel allocation that is opposed to the best case NE in Figure 3 for |C| = 6 and we refer to it as unbalanced (UB) channel allocation.
We calculate the average number of radios per channel as m = |N |·k |C| . We can compare the utilization of every channel c to the average to achieve the total balance of the channel allocation S:
Definition 5: (Balance:) The balance β of a channel allocation S is defined as the sum β(S) = P c∈|C| |k c − m|. Fig. 8 . An example for a worst case channel allocation for Algorithm 3. The channel allocation is completely unbalanced, as opposed to the NE (best case) shown in Figure 3 . Here |C| = 6, |N | = 4 and k = 4.
The notion of balance allows us to define the efficiency of a given channel allocation as a proportion between the worst case and the best case channel allocations.
Definition 6: (Efficiency:) The efficiency φ of a channel allocation S is defined as φ(S) = β(S UB )−β(S) β(SUB)−β(SNE) . Let us emphasize that for any channel allocation S, it is true that 0 ≤ φ(S) ≤ 1. Furthermore, φ(S NE ) = 1 and φ(S UB ) = 0 as desired by this measure.
Let us now define the average efficiency over time and the efficiency ratio. To this end, we denote the efficiency in round t by φ(t, S).
Definition 7: (Average efficiency and efficiency ratio:) The average efficiency φ at round T is defined as the sum φ(T, S) = P T t=1 φ(t, S). We define the efficiency ratio as Φ = lim inf T →∞ φ(T,S) T . Note that the efficiency ratio expresses the performance of the distributed channel allocation algorithm per round over a long period of time. In our simulations, we applied a finite simulation time, hence we measured the efficiency ratio for T = 10000 rounds.
Finally, let us define the convergence time of Algorithm 3 as follows.
Definition 8: (Convergence Time): We define the convergence time of Algorithm 3, as the time when the channel allocation efficiency first reaches the value of one (i.e., the efficiency of a NE, φ(S NE )).
We assume that the duration of one round in the updating algorithm is 10ms. This duration of one round corresponds roughly to the time needed for all these devices to transmit one MAC layer packet, i.e., the time that the devices can learn about other devices in the channel. As mentioned previously, we run each simulation for 10000 rounds, which corresponds to 100s according to the assumption above. Each average value is the result of 100 simulation runs. For the convergence time simulations, we present our results with a 0.95 confidence level on the mean value.
Let us first present an example run for our distributed algorithm with imperfect information in Figure 9 for 20s. One can notice that the algorithm quickly reaches the NE state and thus the average efficiency converges to one. Also, one can observe that the players sometimes leave the NE state due to the second property (change a radio on a channel c ∈ C max in a stable state with probability ), but they quickly return to it.
Suppose that the total data rate per channel is R(k c ) = 54Mbps, for any k c . In Figure 10 , we present a snapshot of the total payoff for the players in one of the NE reached in the previous simulation. One can observe that the total payoff is very similar for the players, hence we conclude that our algorithm converges to fair channel allocations. Next, we investigate the effect of the number of radios per device on the efficiency ratio (shown in Figure 11a ) and on the convergence time of the algorithm (presented in Figure 11b ). We can observe on the figures that Algorithm 3 converges fast with high efficiency ratio if the number of radios per device is 3 or 5. The higher the number of radios per device, the more channels the players know. Hence, more information helps them making their decisions. This is the reason that the convergence is slower if the number of radios is 2. For two radios per devices, the effect of changing the channel for even one radio has a significant impact that undermines the stability of the NE more easily. If the number of radios is 4, then convergence is slow for another reason: There is only one Nash equilibrium channel allocation, namely the perfectly flat one; thus it takes more time to find it. With longer convergence, the efficiency ratio decreases as well.
In Figures 11c and 11d , we investigate the effect of the number of players, each device having three radios. We can see that our distributed algorithm keeps the system in an efficient state, although the efficiency is slightly lower for multiples of |N | with higher convergence time. As mentioned above, the reason is that in this case, there exists only one NE (the perfectly load-balanced) and thus it is more difficult to converge to.
In summary, we can observe that, in spite of the fact that convergence is not theoretically ensured, the proposed distributed algorithm based on imperfect information ensures high system performance and good convergence time.
VIII. CONCLUSION In this paper, we have considered the problem of competitive channel allocation among devices that use multiple radios. Our main conclusion is that, in spite of the noncooperative behavior of such devices, their Nash equilibrium channel allocations result in load balancing. We have also studied fairness issues and coalition-proof NE. Finally, we have provided three algorithms to achieve the efficient, loadbalancing Nash equilibrium channel allocation and we have studied their convergence properties either theoretically or numerically.
In terms of future work, we will extend our current model to include different channel characteristics and payoffs. We will also pursue our theoretical investigations of selfish multiradio channel allocation for general topologies. We will pay particular attention to the application of existing fairness metrics in the competitive context. In addition, we will take the cost of channel scanning into consideration. Last but not least, we will study convergence algorithms that achieve Nash equilibria in general topologies. 
